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INTRODUCTION

What can an eminent mathematician teach law professors?
A good deal-if we just ignore the math.
The Socratic method, once the staple of legal teaching and
perhaps the popular conception of the law classroom, is declining
in popularity and use.1 The reasons are many, 2 but they do not
occupy our thoughts here. This Article is not about weighing the
benefits and drawbacks of the Socratic method, a debate that has
been well covered. 3 The decline in the use of the Socratic method
t Associate Professor, University of Maryland School of Law; M.B.A., University
of Pennsylvania (Wharton); J.D., George Washington University; B.A., University of
Chicago. I thank Brad Borden for his helpful comments. My teaching experiences
recounted in this Article are from my association with the Washburn University
School of Law (2004-2007).
1 See Orin S. Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard, 78 NEB. L.
REV. 113, 113-14 (1999) ("Despite this perception, the traditional Socratic method is
today more myth than reality."); see also Donald G. Marshall, Socratic Method and
the Irreducible Core of Legal Education, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) ('The fact is
that teaching and learning by genuine dialog has all but disappeared from the
second and third years of law school, and is fast disappearing from the first.");
Burnele V. Powell, A Defense of the Socratic Method: An Interview with Martin B.
Louis (1934-94), 73 N.C. L. REV. 957, 967 (1995) ("It is clear to me that the Socratic
method is dying.").
2 See, e.g., Susan H. Williams, Legal Education, Feminist Epistemology, and the
Socratic Method, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1571, 1573-74 (1993) (opining on problems
associated with the Socratic method).
3 See Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392, 40618 (1971) (discussing the debate over the Socratic method); see also Kerr, supra note
1, at 115-22 (explaining that there has been a decline in the use of the Socratic
method at Harvard Law School). I do not give "Socratic method" a precise definition
that connotes a specific pedagogical form, as I, like many others, believe that the
Socratic method is a chameleon, taking on the personality of the teacher and the
students. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 12-14. It is loosely defined here as a
teaching method done primarily through a dialogue between teacher and student, as
compared to lecturing or experiential learning. See id. at 8; see also Kerr, supra note
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is unfortunate because a dialogue between teacher and student is
the essence of teaching and learning. The Socratic method is
traditionally perceived as a teaching tool. But it is more than
that. This Article shows that, once learned, it can be a concrete
analytic tool for the student. In other words, it is an end unto
itself rather than merely a means. Of course, its spiritual root is
grounded in philosophical inquiry, a tradition still followed by
many law teachers, but it can be adapted to a scientific
framework for solving problems.
Many years ago, the
mathematician George P61ya showed generations of math
teachers and students that problem-solving can be learned
through the heuristic of simple questions that stimulate curiosity
and creativity. 4 There is a connection between the Socratic
method and techniques of mathematical problem-solving. This
Article shows how P6lya's heuristic has application to the
teaching of law, and thus it casts the Socratic method in a new
pedagogical light.
Shortly into my law-teaching career, I learned that most law
students dislike math.
When we discuss a legal concept
requiring mathematical thought, the student reception is
invariably one of discomfort and disbelief that law practice can
actually involve some computation or mathematical intuition. 5 I
understand the frustration and skepticism.6 Mathematics and
legal analysis, however, share an important attribute-both are
fundamentally problem-solving branches of knowledge.
In the field of mathematics, no scholar has been more
influential in teaching problem-solving to generations of students
than George P61ya. Not only was he a preeminent scholar of the
twentieth century, 7 but he was also a passionate teacher who

1, at 114 n.3.
4 See G. POLYA, HOW TO SOLVE IT: A NEW ASPECT OF MATHEMATICAL METHOD
1-2, 5 (2d ed. 1957).
5 In my classes, Torts, Business Associations, Corporate Finance, and
Negotiations, basic mathematical intuitions arise more frequently than students
prefer. Examples include complex causation, marginal costs, capital structure, asset
valuation, expected value and probabilities, and basic intuitions of law and
economics.
6 See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 205 tbl.4.1
(2004) (informing that only about 30 percent of law students at Columbia, Harvard,
New York University, Stanford, University of Chicago, and University of Michigan
have business, natural science, or technical backgrounds).
7 See GERALD L. ALEXANDERSON, THE RANDOM WALKS OF GEORGE P6LYA 17192 (2000) (bibliography of P6lya's major works). In the appendix of the biography,
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wrote wonderfully accessible books on the learning process. 8 In
How to Solve It, he set forth a framework-a "heuristic" as he
called it-for solving math problems. He wrote this book because
no one before had adequately explained how to solve a math
problem. Before his advances, a math teacher could explain a
problem, demonstrate a proof, and assist students at each step,
or she could let students struggle with the problem until they
either succeeded or failed. It was either "sink or swim" or throw
the students a fully inflated life raft. At best, students learned
by repetition or quickness of wit; at worst, they failed for lack of
proper direction or analytic framework and lost interest in the
subject altogether.
Thus, teaching the process of solving
mathematical problems suffered from a lack of an understanding
of "the mental operations typically useful in this process."9
The difficulty of teaching how to solve problems is not unique
to math. Law professors strive to develop critical analysis, a skill
not emphasized enough in college education. From the student's
perspective, the first shock of law school is that the process of
lectures, memorization, and regurgitation is alien to law school.
At some point in their experience, they realize that analysis is
more important than learning "the right answer." The solutions
to legal problems can be multivariate depending on the
plausibility of the reasoning, and the problem-solving process is
the education and the practice of law.

Alan Schoenfeld provides an essay on P61ya's contributions to teaching. In his
career, P61ya was affiliated with-among other institutions-Cambridge, Oxford,
and Stanford. Alan H. Schoenfeld, George P6lya and Mathematics Education,in THE
RANDOM WALKS OF GEORGE P6LYA, supra, at 233-36.
8 See generally P6LYA, HOW TO SOLVE IT, supra note 4; G. P6LYA, INDUCTION
AND ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS: VOLUME I OF MATHEMATICS AND PLAUSIBLE
REASONING (1954); G. P6LYA, PATTERNS OF PLAUSIBLE INFERENCE: VOLUME II OF

MATHEMATICS AND PLAUSIBLE REASONING (1954). My interest in P61ya came about
serendipitously. I am not a student of math, nor am I particularly fond of the
subject. During the research and writing of two articles on bargaining theory, I came
across Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning, which set forth in an accessible
presentation his theory of the nature of probability and plausible reasoning. See
generally Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining:An Inquiry into the
Selection of Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619 (2006);
Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193
(2007). P6lya's ideas were simple and plain-the kind one recognizes as having the
quality of truth. After finishing my articles, I took an interest in P6lya and
subsequently read his biography and How to Solve It.
9 P6LYA, HOW TO SOLVE IT, supra note 4, at 129-30.
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To develop problem-solving skills, the traditional-and
perhaps idealized-law school class is devoted to a dialogue, an
intellectual journey whose end is sometimes unclear.
One
questions, one reasons, one arrives at tentative conclusions, only
to question again. This quicksand-like process is the source of
befuddlement and stress, particularly for first-year students. In
the intellectual quest for the law, the student rightfully shares a
substantial burden of discovery. 10
The Socratic method
facilitates this process of learning. Classes can have the feel of a
dialogue: the right questions, level of student participation,
challenges, and disagreements among students and professor. At
times, however, the method becomes stale or mechanical; an air
of routinization can set in. We discuss the issue, holding,
rationale and policy, and ask "but what if' or "but how about,"
probing the limits of a holding or reasoning. But sometimes the
dialogue seems to lack a grander design. It is easy to see how a
repeated diet of the Socratic method can lead to a feeling of a
monochromatic routine."
The hope is that the incremental
accumulations of these sessions, enlightening or discouraging or
tedious as they may be, become the building blocks for thinking
like a competent lawyer.
The Socratic method emphasizes repetitive tasks: deriving
issues, holdings, rules of law, policy, and principles.
Additionally,
the students' limits are tested through
hypotheticals and professorial challenges. 12
Through this
repetition, students learn the first level of legal analysis-the
critical analysis of legal authority, case by case and statute by
statute. 13 There is no doubt that students eventually learn this
vital skill. Then there is the next level of legal analysis-the
more complex task of weaving law and fact to form a persuasive
10 "Not having a right answer to write down in your notes can be extremely
frustrating. First-year American law students have the same complaint. They, too,
want certainty. They learn that they cannot have it. The better the law school, the
less certainty, and the more students have to think for themselves." GEORGE P.
FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE BASICS

10 (2005).
11 See Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching Techniques in
American Law Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 32 (1996) (explaining how "a

restlessness with the Socratic method is taking root").
12 See Kerr, supra note 1, at 114 n.3, 116-17.
13 See id. at 117 ('With the Socratic reasoning process internalized, students
become experts at critiquing their own prejudgments, leading to open-minded,
bifocal, and sophisticated understandings of law.").
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theory of the case. The assumption has been that once students
learn to analyze legal authority, they can take the next step of
disaggregating a complex fact pattern and reconstituting the
facts to support a case theory built on logical or plausible
interpretations of the legal structure. Of course, we test for this
in the final exam. On this second level of analysis, I am less
sanguine. Students need a framework, a heuristic that puts the
classroom process into a larger structure of a problem-solving
process. The mechanical repetitions of the Socratic method,
without more, may not always resonate with students, 14 who may
find it difficult to connect the abstraction of case and policy
analyses to the real world of messy facts and uncertain law. 15 If,
however, the Socratic method is complemented with an
understanding of a broader framework of the problem-solving
process, students may connect the dots that go from the Socratic
method to the analysis of legal authority, and finally to the
construction of case theory.
My concern is not so much with whether students can learn
to analyze discrete legal authority, but rather with whether they
can combine analysis of facts and law in the ultimate task of
I distinguish case analysis, which
legal problem-solving. 16
involves the formulation of legal rules from primary sources (on
the scale of skills a rather ordinary task), from case theory
synthesis, which involves the complex task of problem-solving
through the application of rules. My concern in this area arises
from my experience. While teaching past courses in Business
Associations and Civil Procedure, I gave short answer questions
in the final exam in addition to long essay questions with
complex fact patterns. The short answer questions presented
14 See Powell, supra note 1, at 967, 970 (noting student dislike of the Socratic
method).
15 See Kerr, supra note 1, at 119 (discussing Jerome Frank's criticism of "the
Socratic classroom as an overly academic and library-focused product of Langdellian
legal science" and noting that Frank thought "the true work of a lawyer consists of
solving the real problems of real clients"). See generally Jerome Frank, Why Not a
Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933) (criticizing the conceptual
teaching method in law schools and proposing a curriculum that would more
strongly resemble the actual practice of law).
16 Of course, this is from a litigation perspective, which is the predominant
perspective for the first year curriculum. Core analytic skills are common to lawyers
across all fields, but the focus can be different. For example, transactional lawyers
focus on a different set of skills involving such things as drafting, negotiations, and
economic structuring.
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discrete problems that required the application of one or two
rules of law, and they were used to test areas considered less
important or miscellaneous. Students tended to perform very
well on the short questions and the variance of the scores was
low. Their performances suggest that as a class they studied
hard
The distributions of performance in the long essays,
however, were a broader distribution of good, average, and poor
answers. The difference is that the long essay format required
more sophisticated problem-solving skills such as sorting facts,
organizing them, handling multiple rules, and picking their
application.
The issue of problem-solving also came to light in an exercise
conducted in another Civil Procedure class. Throughout the
class, the case study method supplemented the Socratic method
of teaching. The case study included numerous client interview
notes, pleadings, motions, orders, letters, and other documents
constituting a litigation file. 17 A weekend-long, take-home
midterm was given in the format of additional documents and file
materials, such as summary judgment motions, and the question
simply asked the students to advise the client. Much to my
surprise, when the problem was presented in this manner, the
class as a whole performed poorly. Subsequent class discussion
with students showed that they recognized and understood the
issues, at least in compartmentalized form, but they had great
difficulty putting the entire case together in a way that "solves
the problem" for the client.' 8 Without the stylized structure of a
law school exam, in which the facts are neatly packaged and a
specific call of the question is given, students struggled with the
task of finding the relevant facts within a package of documents,
putting them together, weighing them, identifying relevant
issues, assessing the applicable law, and forming a theory of the

17 This case study was based on a real case I handled in private practice, but all
documents were manufactured for the purpose of the exercise.
18 When thinking about these issues, I recall an apropos scene from the movie
The Karate Kid. Mr. Miyagi, the sensei, instructs his student Daniel to do various
household chores-painting a fence, washing a car, scrubbing the floor-all in
precisely instructed mechanical bodily movements. At the end of these tedious tasks,
Daniel has mastered them. He is also tired and complains, believing there was no
object lesson in the tasks other than doing Mr. Miyagi's chores. Only when Mr.
Miyagi demonstrates that the precise mechanical movements are really a method of
blocking and striking in karate does Daniel realize that the repetition of seemingly
mundane tasks has an essential lesson.
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case.
In short, they struggled with the uncertainty and
complexity of the assignment.19
With these experiences behind me as a relatively new
professor, I came across How to Solve It. There, P6lya dispelled
the notion that the process of solving a problem was deductive.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom of the day, he showed that
the process of solving problems is inductive, depending on
educated guesses and messy intuitions that may or may not
advance the problem. Legal problem-solving also involves an
inductive process, where experience, analogy, trial-and-error, and
motivation are just as important as logic and ordered deduction.
Lawyers, like engineers or mathematicians, solve problems that
are constrained by rules. 20 There are many views of legal
analysis, of course, but one view is a scientific process of
discovery: understanding the problem, discerning the knowns
and the unknowns, applying related theorems or principles, and
conducting a trial-and-error process of experimentation. P61ya
argued for the application of this scientific process to the practice
of mathematics.
I.

MATHEMATICIAN, TEACHER, AND LAWYER (ALMOST)

A brief biography of P6lya is sketched to highlight a
noteworthy point-that an abandoned legal career influenced,
perhaps in a small measure, P6lya's thoughts about mathematics
and teaching. 21 The law played a relevant role early in P6lya's
life. His father became a lawyer after abandoning a career in
22
medicine because he could not stomach the sight of blood.
Unfortunately, he was not a very successful lawyer despite
19 To some extent, this is a crossover problem shared with a school's legal
writing program, which focuses on presentation and analysis. Presentation and
analysis, like language and intelligence, are inextricably tied, but the doctrinal side
of teaching bears a burden of teaching the mental process needed for good
presentation. While the Socratic method is the best way to teach this mental
process, the suggestion is that it can be better aligned with the goals of the case
method in order to more fully prepare law students for their future work as
attorneys.
20 See Elizabeth Garrett, Becoming Lawyers: The Role of the Socratic Method in
Modern Law Schools, 1 GREEN BAG 199, 201 (1998) (discussing the relationship
between the Socratic method and problem-solving skills, and stating that ultimately,
lawyers are problem-solvers).
21 See generally ALEXANDERSON, supra note 7, for a full biography of P6lya's

life.
22 Id. at 9.
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"brilliance and honesty," as he had a habit of throwing "ink
bottles at clients seeking legal excuses for ethically indefensible
23
purposes."
Upon his father's death, P6lya's mother pressed him to follow
in his father's footsteps and study law. P6lya dutifully did so, but
soon abandoned the pursuit, because he found the study of law
boring. 24 His intellectual interests then wandered through
and
literature,
philosophy, physics,
classic languages,
mathematics. He ultimately chose to focus on mathematics,
famously explaining, "I am not good enough for physics and I am
too good for philosophy. Mathematics is in between." 25 He was
at first reluctant to devote himself to mathematics because his
26
experiences with his pre-university math teachers were mixed.
His early experiences with teachers were influential as he came
to value mentoring relationships. His career as a mathematician
was marked by successful apprenticeships and partnerships with
a number of mentors and collaborators. We get a sense for
P6lya-the person, scholar, and teacher-from the following
letter of recommendation by one such mentor, written early in
P6lya's career:
First of all, there is P6lya. His way of doing mathematics is
really completely foreign to me. He is to a lesser degree
concerned with knowledge but rather with the joy of the hunt.
However, I admire his brilliance extraordinarily. His ideas are
certainly not of the type that would cast light on the major
relationships of knowledge. His papers are rather single, bold
advances toward very specific, limited points in an undiscovered
land that will remain totally in the dark. But his questions are
He is full of problems, and is an
somewhat unusual.
exceptionally stimulating person in mathematical circles. As an
educator he may be somewhat hindered by his anxious desire to
temper his investigations to well-defined, precise problems;
however, he cares about his students in a way that is best
As far as applied
described as "sincere fellowship."
mathematics is concerned, he is especially strong in probability
theory, and has also published in that field. In addition, he is
very knowledgeable in applications (physics, statistics, etc.).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 16.
25 Id. at 17.
26 Id. at 18 (relating how of P6lya's pre-university math teachers, "two were
despicable and one was good").
23
24

2007]

MATHEMATICAL HEURISTIC OF GEORGE P6LYA

889

Overall, he is a very versatile guy (as far as I know, he studied
the
classics, law,
and
physics before
becoming
a
mathematician); he is straightforward and doesn't wear
27
blinders. I have the utmost respect for him as a person.
This letter hints at the contributions P61ya would later make
as a scholar and teacher. He enjoyed the "hunt" of the problem
28
and preferred problem-solving to "vast theoretical constructs."
Like all great scholars, his ideas were original. In the field of
teaching, he emphasized the importance of induction and
plausible reasoning. Traditionally, mathematics was seen as a
demonstrative branch of knowledge. Demonstrative reasoning is
rigid and beyond controversy. No one can argue against the
proposition that 2 + 2 = 4, or that a well-written proof is a selfcontained set of infallible logical statements. The premium is
placed on rules and their manipulation into a logical sequence.
On the other hand, induction and plausible reasoning are messy,
fallible, and fluid. As a teacher, P6lya believed that the process
of induction was inseparable from the field of mathematics:
We secure our mathematical knowledge by demonstrative
reasoning, but we support our conjectures by plausible
reasoning. A mathematical proof is demonstrative reasoning,
but the inductive evidence of the physicist, the circumstantial
evidence of the lawyer, the documentary evidence of the
historian, and the statistical evidence of the economist belong to
plausible reasoning.
Mathematics is regarded as a demonstrative science. Yet this is
only one of its aspects. Finished mathematics presented in a
finished form appears as purely demonstrative, consisting of
proofs only. Yet mathematics in the making resembles any
other human knowledge in the making. You have to guess a
mathematical theorem before you prove it; you have to guess
the idea of the proof before you carry through the details. You
have to combine observations and follow analogies; you have to
try and try again. The result of the mathematician's creative
work is demonstrative reasoning, a proof; but the proof is
discovered by plausible reasoning, by guessing. If the learning
of mathematics reflects to any degree the invention of

27

Id.

28

Id. at 94.

at 38-41 (offering a letter of Hermann Weyl, written in 1921).
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mathematics,
it must have a place for guessing, for plausible
29
inference.
One factor that influenced this philosophy is his early
exposure to the law. Evidence of his understanding of the legal
process appears in several parts of his works. 30 In Induction and
Analogy in Mathematics, P6lya explains the basic source of
plausible reasoning: "Experience modifies human beliefs. We
learn from experience or, rather, we ought to learn from
experience. To make the best possible use of experience is one of
the great human tasks and to work for this task is the proper
vocation of scientists. ' 31 This sentiment is a close kin to Oliver
Wendell Holmes's exposition on the path of the law. Holmes
believed that "[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.... [I]t cannot be dealt with as if it contained only
the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics." 32 Just as
Holmes emphasized the importance of human events and
influence-rational and irrational, avowed and unconsciousP6lya humanized mathematical reasoning, separating out and
giving fair credit to the distinctly human intelligence of intuition,
guessing, and plausible reasoning.3 3 It is not logic alone or the
skillful manipulation of rules that solves a difficult problem.
Problem-solving requires inductive reasoning faciliated by a
heuristic that stimulates the mental process. Thus P61ya, "the
almost-lawyer," would have surely identified with the difficulties
of mastering legal analysis and teaching it.

29

POLYA, INDUCTION AND ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS, supra note 8, at v-vi.

See P6LYA, PATTERNS OF PLAUSIBLE INFERENCE, supra note 8, at 110
(discussing how rational people may come to opposite conclusions). Other
mathematicians have also taken an interest in the process of legal analysis,
particularly in the field of probability theory. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A
TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 25-27 (6th' prtg. 1957) (discussing Chaplin v. Hicks,
(1911) 2 K.B. 786 (U.K.)); see also M.G. BULMER, PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS 6 (Dover
Publications 1979) (1965).
30

31
32

POLYA, INDUCTION AND ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS, supra note 8, at 3.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,

Harvard Univ. Press 1967) (1881).
33 See P6LYA, PATTERNS OF PLAUSIBLE INFERENCE, supra note 8, at 115-16.
P6lya explained that demonstrative reasoning is "machinelike," whereas plausible
reasoning is "human." Id. at 115.
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II. HOW TO SOLVE IT
P6lya synthesized his heuristic for solving mathematical
34
problems in How to Solve It, which he wrote while at Stanford.
He set forth a four-step process, of which the first two are the
35
focus here.
Understandingthe Problem. A student must understand the
problem before she can solve it. This thought seems obvious, but
many students attempt to solve a problem without first
understanding it. Understanding the problem means more than
understanding the question. P6lya asked as an example, "[What
is] the diagonal of a rectangular parallelepiped in which the
length, the width and the height are known?" 36 Even one who is
wholly unfamiliar with geometry can understand the question
being asked. But understanding the problem means that she
must also know its essential nature. P6lya suggested that the
teacher should guide the student with general questions: Can
you restate the problem? What is the known? What is the
unknown? What are the limiting conditions? These questions
are meant not to lead the student towards the solution,
something P6lya cautioned against, but to provide a framework
to understand the nature of the problem.
Devising a Plan. No problem can be solved without
understanding its essential nature. 37 Thereafter, the task is to
devise a plan of execution. P6lya emphasized that knowledge
builds upon itself: "We know, of course, that it is hard to have a
good idea if we have little knowledge of the subject, and
impossible to have it if we have no knowledge. Good ideas are

34 Since its publication in 1945, the book has become a classic in mathematics.
It is one of Princeton University Press's all-time best sellers. ALEXANDERSON, supra
note 7, at 114. It remains in print today, has sold over a million copies, and has been
translated into at least twenty-one languages. Id.
35 POLYA, HOW TO SOLVE IT, supra note 4, at xvii, 12-19. The last two steps are
entitled "Carrying out the Plan" and "Looking Back." The former calls for checking
each step of the solution. The latter calls for checking the solution and argument. Id.
Obviously, these steps translate well to the exam-writing process and to general
good habits of law practice.
36 Id. at 7. A parallelepiped is a solid with six parallelogram faces that are
parallel to the opposite face, e.g., a rectangular box.
37 Id. at 6 ("It is foolish to answer a question that you do not understand. It is
sad to work for an end that you do not desire. Such foolish and sad things often
happen, in and out of school, but the teacher should try to prevent them from
happening in his class.").
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based on past experience and formerly acquired knowledge." 38 In
solving a problem, the student may get a "bright idea" and solve
it. If not, he must go about the more difficult task of finding the
solution. P6lya suggested reasoning by analogy: Do you know a
related problem? What is the unknown? Is there a smaller
problem that can be solved? These questions stimulate the
creative, inductive process, eliciting a series of educated guesses
and intuitions, some of which may lead nowhere and some of
which may advance the problem. 39 This process constitutes the
steady, if not methodical, "hunt" for the solution.
The above method seems to border on the trite. On first
P6lya
pass, the guidelines seem too general to be helpful.
cautions, however, against providing too much help to the
student. Any help by the teacher must be "unobtrusive" and
facilitate "the ability of the student and not just a special
technique." 40 He' emphasized the importance of developing good
"mental habit[s]. "41 The teacher's role should be to "indicate a
general direction and leave plenty for the student to do." 42 His
heuristic strikes a balance between providing no direction and
too much help-both of which are easier forms of teaching-and
in so doing, the teacher facilitates the development of the
student's mental habits.
P6lya's heuristic casts a different, albeit subtle, light on the
Socratic method. Understanding the problem is the first, and
arguably most important, part of the problem-solving process.
This is different from the traditional statement of the legal issue;
which is a statement of the question that the court decided.
While this statement is necessary, it also dresses the problem in

38

Id. at 9.

39 P6LYA, INDUCTION AND ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS, supra note 8, at vi

(discussing how P6lya believed that educated guessing was an essential ingredient
to creative problem-solving, and quoting him as stating, "Certainly, let us learn
proving, but also let us learnguessing.").
40 P6LYA, HOW TO SOLVE IT, supra note 4, at 21.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 4. Donald Marshall also expressed a similar sentiment. He believed
that the teacher should:
provide students with less subtle clues to the existence and nature of the
misconception and ... expedite the timing and impact of the restorative
part of the dialog. However, the teacher who modifies Socrates's technique
must be ever alert to the danger of significantly diminishing student selfdiscovery, and to the ultimate sin of making the dialogue avuncular.
Marshall, supra note 1, at 12.
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legalism. Since tort law is one of my subjects, I use examples
from torts class. 43 Consider a typical subject, the definition of
intent in a case of battery. Of course, the easy case of battery is
striking someone with the intent to harm. But cases can be more
subtle. Consider the following three cases: a young child slightly
kicked another child in a playful gesture after class was called to
order, thereby causing an unexpectedly severe injury;44 a piano
teacher, during a social visit, tapped the back of his student's
shoulder with his fingers in a simulation of a piano technique,
thereby causing an unforeseeable neurological injury; 45 a
recreational football player jumped in the air to catch the ball,
and upon coming down, stepped on another player's hand,
breaking her fingers.46 In the first two cases (the child and the
piano teacher) liability arose, whereas in the last case (the
47
football player) there was no liability.
These cases make for great discussion. We can envision a
traditional line of Socratic inquiry going something like this:
What is the issue in these cases? What are the holdings? Why
should the young child be liable for just intending a slight kick in
the course of horseplay? What if the piano teacher's intent was
to swat away a fly and incidentally touched his student's
shoulder? What did the football player intend to do? Do we have
intent if an intentional touch has any injurious consequences? If
not, what is the dividing line between liability and no liability?
These and other questions would surely be implemented while
utilizing the Socratic method. Trying to place myself in the
frame of reference of a first year law student, in a sort of a
Rawlsian "veil of ignorance," if you will, I would probably be
confused by these questions. Confusion is not bad per se if there
is resolution, however tentative. These questions are highly
relevant, specific, and legalistic. No doubt that they are properly

43 For the past four years I have adopted WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F.
GRADY, TORTS: CASES AND QUESTIONS (2004). This casebook is outstanding in many
ways. In particular, it approaches legal analysis as a cluster of related cases, which
are sometimes seemingly contradictory, and the students must understand and
organize these cases into a broader framework. Importantly, my students generally
like the book.
44 Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 403-04, (Wis. 1891).
45 White v. Univ. of Idaho, 768 P.2d 827, 828 (Idaho 1989).
46 Knight v. Jewett, 275 Cal. Rptr. 292, 293 (Ct. App. 1990), afl'd, 834 P.2d 696
(1992).
47 Knight, 834 P.2d at 712; White, 768 P.2d at 828; Vosburg, 50 N.W. at 404.
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designed to train a student in the legal analysis of authority. No
doubt also that subsequent analysis of policies underlying the
rule of law would give students a better understanding of the
social problem raised by these cases. I do not cast any criticism
on this type of questioning.
But consider an alternative approach, one that P6lya might
have taken were he a law professor: What is the problem in
these cases? A student may respond, "The definition of intent."
Not satisfied with this generic answer, which simply confirms the
student understood the question, we can suggest that the student
looks at the problem from a different way: What are the known
facts in each case pertaining to the defendant's intent? The child
was horsing around; class was called to order; the kick was only
slight and not meant to hurt. The piano teacher wanted to
demonstrate a piano technique; the student was not in class and
did not consent to the touch; the student did not expect the touch.
The recreational football player wanted to catch the football; he
did not intend to break her fingers. What do these facts say
about what intent means? The student may answer, "a specific
intent to harm the other person is not needed for liability." What
else is known? The football player was found not liable while the
child and the piano teacher were found liable. We circle back to
the original question: What is the real problem here? The
student may answer, "We have to define intent." What are the
And what are the
"knowns" about the definition so far?
unknowns? This is the essential problem of intent, and thestudent now bears the burden of solving the problem. After more
thought, she may frame the problem differently. Intent could
have several definitions: Is it the intent to harm another? The
intent to do the act that causes the harm? Or the intent to cause
an unlawful contact? Once the problem is understood, the
student has made substantial progress toward understanding the
solution and the difference between intentional torts and
negligence.
In presenting these alternative approaches, the suggestion is
not that the two lines of dialogue are radically different-they
are not. In actuality, there is more commonality than difference.
The
Rather, there is a subtle change in tone and focus.
traditional Socratic dialogue is specific and employs the common
language of legal analysis: recitation of material facts, statement
of the issue, derivation of holding and rule of law, and analysis of
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reasoning and policy and their limits. The focus is on the
distillation of rules and principles. The dialogue is familiar and
thus routine. The alternative approach denudes the inquiry of
legalism, and instead focuses on restating the problem to one of
definitional ambiguity. Both approaches seek the same result,
but come at the problem from slightly different angles. There
may be times when the traditional Socratic dialogue can be
supplemented by focusing on understanding the problem and
restating it beyond simply a statement of the issue and legal
policies surrounding the judicial decision.
Devising a plan is P6lya's second step to solving a problem.
Here, he asks the student some basic questions: Do you know a
related problem? Can you use the related problem? What is the
unknown? Consider again a typical problem in torts. Virtually
all students study Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Co., 4 8 which
set forth the classic debate on the scope of duty in negligence. 49
This topic is rich in theory and philosophy, and discussion should
be lively. Once it is covered, many classes proceed at some point
to a discussion of negligent infliction of emotional distress as a
special problem in the area of duty. The traditional approach is
to assign cases showing how the common law has muddled
through this issue in regards to legal aspects such as physical
impact, physical manifestation, zone of danger test, and
50
bystander tests.
An alternative approach could apply P6lya's heuristic of
devising a plan. Before even assigning the case readings on
emotional distress, we can provide the fact pattern from Waube v.
Warrington,51 an early and influential case establishing the zone
of danger test. In Waube, a mother witnessed from afar her
daughter being struck and killed by a car and the resulting shock
led to severe emotional distress. 52 The student is asked to solve
this social problem by constructing the rule of law with the
knowledge they have accumulated thus far. What is the problem
48

248 N.Y. 339, 343, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).

49 See id. at 343, 162 N.E. at 100.
50 See generally Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of

Emotional Distress Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 813-23 (2004) (discussing the
development of common law principles affecting claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress).
51 258 N.W. 497 (Wis. 1935), overruled by Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,
517 N.W.2d 432 (Wis. 1994).
52

Id. at 497.
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here? After some discussion, which may be lengthy, the student
identifies the social ramification of unlimited liability based on a
"foreseeability of harm" standard, the ever expanding ripple of
liability. The problem is balancing the desire to provide remedy
and limiting social liability to tolerable levels.
Since emotional distress cases have not been assigned,
devising a plan to solve this problem requires the student to work
with limited knowledge. Does he or she know a related problem
that raised these social issues? After some discussion, perhaps
the student hits upon a vague resemblance to Palsgraf. What is
the unknown? What did Palsgraf answer and what did it not
answer? The student notes the differences in the injuries. Mrs.
Palsgraf suffered a physical injury, but the mother's injury is
emotional distress.5 3 We can ask the student to devise a legal
standard that "solves" the problem of emotional distress claims.
The student guesses and intuits. One answer may be a blanket
rule against liability. Another may be that only those who are
especially close to the victim, like parents and siblings, should be
allowed to recover. Still another solution may be that if Mrs.
Palsgraf, who was a distance away from the brown package of
explosives, cannot recover for her physical injuries, then
certainly a mother who is standing afar from the accident should
not recover either. Indeed, this last solution is the reasoning
that undergirds the classic zone of danger test, 54 and in Waube,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court analogized to Palsgrafon precisely
this ground.5 5 Thus, in the common law, there is direct lineage
from Palsgrafto the zone of danger test.
All of the above solutions to the problem were tried by
nineteenth and twentieth century judges. 56 By allowing students
to create the solution to a difficult legal problem-by allowing
them to replicate the mental processes of an early twentieth
century judge without the benefit of case law in this area-the
teacher stimulates the legal problem-solving skill more than a
53
While this is the common understanding, Mrs. Palsgraf s injury was a speech
impediment presumably caused by nervous shock. See Rhee, supra note 50, at 84849 and accompanying notes. Indeed, the original New York Times article covering
the accident listed Mrs. Palsgrafs injury as "shock." Bomb Blast Injures 13 in
Station Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1924, at 1.
54 See Rhee, supra note 50, at 849-50.
55 258 N.W. at 497-98, 501. I do not suggest that Waube properly applied
Palsgraf,as it did not. See Rhee, supra note 50, at 806-23, 883.
56 See generally Rhee, supra note 50, at 806-23, 883.
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standard dialogue of case-by-case analysis. In some ways, the
Socratic method of case analysis is a postmortem, which is fine
for most occasions.
Legal education encourages students to
second guess judges who arrived at tentative solutions to social
problems. 57 But sometimes it may be fun and educational for
students to put on their mathematical hats, if only in spirit, and
solve the problem through intuition, guessing, and analogy
without the benefit of a judge's wisdom. If the student attempts
to solve the social problem without the benefit of caselaw, the
subsequent readings in this area will stimulate far greater
critical thinking.
Ultimately, P6lya advocated creativity-not of the fictional,
fanciful or unreasonable variety, or the innate kind that produces
the unexpected "bright idea," but the learned kind acquired
through hard work and required to solve hard problems. His
heuristic, while simple, is designed to stimulate the thought
process in an "unobtrusive" manner: What is the problem? Can
you restate it in your own words? What is known? What is
unknown? What are the conditions? Is there an analogous
problem? Can you use that solution to this problem?
This problem-solving approach lends itself to the "case
method" of teaching. 5 As discussed, my experiences using case
studies have been mixed. The problem in my class, as I have
analyzed it, is that students depend too much on a structured
57 Cf. Powell, supra note 1, at 963-64.
58 The case method of teaching is a major component

of business school
education. The Harvard Business School is most famous for developing the case
study method, but other major business schools like the Wharton School use it on a
frequent basis as well. The Harvard Business School collects, compiles and
manufactures case studies that it then sells to other schools, professors, and
students. See, e.g., Harvard Business Online for Educators, Harvard Business School
Cases, http://harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard.eduhbsp/case-studies.jsp
(last
visited July 30, 2007). In law school, the case study method is applied less. The
problem is that the development of a case study is labor intensive. Each case study
entails the culling together of facts and documents that provides a rich portrait of an
actual or manufactured case, allowing a student to become immersed in the problem
at hand. If the case study method is used in law school, the professor most likely had
a suitable case from prior practice or had to create one in her own initiative. There is
not an institutional source from which case studies are collected and offered for use.
Recently, the Stanford Law School has begun to manufacture and make available
detailed, thoughtful case studies in environmental law. See Stanford Law School
Case Studies Collection, http://www.law.stanford.edu/publications/casestudies (last
visited July 30, 2007). The development, collection, and wide use of legal case
studies to supplement the traditional law school case would be a wonderful
advancement.
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way of thinking about a problem. Structure comes not only in
the form of the expectation of a traditional law school exam
format, but also in the traditional way of analyzing case law
utilizing the vehicle of the Socratic method. The Socratic method
gives the impression that legal analysis is an abstract exercise in
legal science as expressed in appellate opinions and devoid of the
uncertainties and messiness of the real world of legal problems.
The case method can be a wonderful pedagogical device that
complements traditional case analysis. The Socratic method,
modified by a problem-solving heuristic, may help students to
transition from the abstraction of legal rules and principles to the
concrete world of uncertainty and multidimensional plausibility
of solutions. This transition is vital for the acquisition of legal
problem-solving skills.
CONCLUSION

As a relatively new law teacher, I wrote this Article to sort
out my own understanding of how to teach legal problem-solving
skills within a Socratic dialogue. In my view, it is unfortunate
that the teaching method is declining in popularity and use. The
Socratic method, in whatever unique shape and personality given
by the collaboration between teacher and student, is effective and
it will be the mainstay of my teaching method for many years to
come. But sometimes the dialogue can fall into a routine as
method and frame of reference remain the same and predictable.
Repetition is good for learning, but it can be stifling as well. By
applying P6lya's problem-solving heuristic to legal teaching from
time to time, we can vary the tone and cadence of the dialogue in
subtle ways. We can change the language of the discussion, the
frame of reference, and perhaps in due course the mental
processes to analyze not only legal authority, but also the more
complex legal problem of creating case theory. Moreover, a
problem-solving approach to the dialogue may better complement
other pedagogical methods, in particular the case study method.
Writing this Article has allowed me to better understand the
problem of teaching effectively through the Socratic method. As
P6lya observed, if you do not understand the problem, you cannot
solve it.

